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George Washington’s
Constitution
By KURT LASH
Review of Imperial from the Beginning: The
Constitution of the Original Executive, by Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015
The ghost of George Washington haunts almost every
page of Saikrishna Prakash’s new book, Imperial from
the Beginning: The Constitution of the Original
Executive. It is a man, not a text, that dominates
Prakash’s investigation of the creation of the American
Presidency. From the Philadelphia Convention where
Washington presided over (and likely inâuenced) the
drafting of Article II, to the military quashing of the
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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Whiskey Rebellion with Washington riding at the head
of the new federal army--it is the “imperial” presence
and practices of General Washington that Prakash
believes generally represent the original
understanding of Executive Power.
This is a wonderful book for legal history buãs and
anyone interested in the American Presidency. In
addition to illustrating Prakash’s formidable grasp of
historical theories of executive power, Imperial from
the Beginning serves as a nice corrective to those who
insist that the Founders abandoned altogether any
notion of monarchical power. As Prakash recounts,
the American Constitution created a quasimonarchical Chief Executive whose powers were but
partially constrained by Congress and the Courts.
Understanding these powers requires less an
investigation of the text than an exploration of a man.
Washington’s practices as our árst chief executive
established traditions and understandings that have
informed every subsequent presidency. In Washington,
America came as close as it ever would to having a
King and, according to Prakash, his practices
illuminate the original understanding of executive
power.
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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Prakash’s central claim is that the simple words “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America” (Art. II, Sect. 1, cl. 1) had
the profound eãect of transferring to the Chief
Executive a complete set of quasi-monarchical powers.
All additional texts relating to the President and the
Executive Branch either clarify or constrain this
original unenumerated grant of power. Understanding
the grant therefore requires understanding the full
meaning of two words, “executive power,” and the
implications of granting such power to a single
individual.
Prakash demurs regarding the relevance of his book to
determining the modern scope of presidential power.
However, as a work purporting to present the original
meaning of the Constitution, Prakash knows (and
probably hopes) his arguments will aãect
contemporary debates about constitutional executive
power. Not surprisingly, the book explores any
number of contemporary disputes including whether
the Constitution creates a Unitary Executive (yes),
whether the president is immune from civil suit (no),
executive commandeering of state oäcials (just áne),

http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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and whether the president enjoys unenumerated
power to respond to national emergencies (nope).
As one might expect, the use of originalist
methodology to determine the scope of executive
power is controversial (see the recent essay by Stephen
Griän). Whatever one’s views about originalism,
however, the methodology remains a ubiquitous
aspect of American constitutional practice. This
means that signiácant historical works like Prakash’s
new book will, and should, receive both scholarly and
judicial attention. Unfortunately, although Prakash
claims to embrace originalist methodology, he never
adequately explains his particular approach or how it
aãects his collection and analysis of historical
evidence.
Originalism as an interpretive methodology involves
some basic theoretical commitments. As Lawrence
Solum has demonstrated,[1] most contemporary
originalists agree that the meaning of constitutional
text is áxed at the time of its adoption and that this
meaning should meaningfully constrain contemporary
judicial application of the text. Exactly how one
determines the original áxed meaning, however,
diãers somewhat from originalist to originalist.
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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Probably all originalists agree that public commentary
about the meaning of a proposed constitutional text
(for example, during the ratiácation period) provides
helpful evidence of the original communicative
meaning of the text. Unfortunately, public
commentary often is sparse or non-existent. This
forces the originalist to turn to less universally
accepted sources of evidence, such as statements of
framers’ intent, background principles of law or postadoption commentary and practices. The greater the
reliance on these less-universally accepted sources of
evidence, the less broadly acceptable the author’s
ultimate conclusions (to other originalists, at least).
In the case of executive power, neither the text nor
contemporary public discussion expressly focuses on
issues such as “the unitary executive” and “presidential
immunity” and “executive commandeering of state
oäcials.” One could, therefore, follow originalist
theorists like Jack Balkin and conclude that bare
textual meaning was rather thin. This in turn allows
for a wide variety of choices for later political and
judicial “construction.”
Prakash, however, believes the original meaning of the
text was much thicker and allows for fairly speciác
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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conclusions regarding the meaning of “executive
power.” Here, Prakash embraces what Solum would
call “contextual enrichment” whereby historical
context adds âesh and muscle to an otherwise bare
skeletal meaning of the text. Prakash rejects what he
calls the “‘literary theory’ of the Presidency, whereby
the president’s powers are narrowly construed and
wholly dependent on a lawyerly reading of the
Constitution.” (p. 7) Instead, Prakash seeks “a holistic
picture of constitutional text,” (p. 4) one that
“recaptures original conceptions of the Constitution’s
presidency.” As Prakash puts it:
This book’s claims about the meaning of
constitutional phrases rest on eighteenth-century
usage. It recounts what people of that era said
about the meaning of various words, phrases and
clauses found in the Constitution.
This seems uncontroversial on its face. Identifying
historical patterns of usage for words and phrases prior
to their adoption as legal texts is a major goal of most
contemporary originalist scholarship. This approach
allows us to discover that, at the time of their
adoption, the words “domestic violence” were broadly
understood as a reference to local insurrections and
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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not as a reference to spousal abuse. It also avoids the
logical and evidentiary problems associated with
trying to determine each framers’ intent.
But Prakash does not limit his search for “usage” to
patterns in place at the time of the text’s adoption and
ratiácation. Nor is he primarily interested in
ratiácation-period “conceptions” of executive power.
Instead, Prakash embraces any eighteenth century
usage that he believes illuminate “original
conceptions.” This includes not only ideas derived from
English common law, but also—indeed, especially—
post-adoption usage and commentary. And not just
any post adoption usage and commentary; Prakash’s
speciác goal is to present a “Washingtonian conception
of the chief executive” (p. 4).
By doing so, Prakash moves away from an identiáable
originalist approach and towards a kind of amalgam of
originalism and common law tradition. This does not
mean that his conclusions wrong (indeed, I think a
number of his propositions about executive power are
strongly supported by the pre-adoption historical
record). However, it has the eãect of rendering his
project to recover our “Washingtonian Constitution”
rather suspect in the eyes of originalists. And that’s
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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problematic given that this is the audience most likely
to be interested in his book.
For example, Prakash’s main arguments regarding
scope of executive power involve the omission of
certain words from Article II and the post-adoption
practices of George Washington. The omission
involves the framers’ decision not to include the words
“herein granted” in describing the powers of the
Executive as they had Article I when describing the
powers of Congress. This, to Prakash, suggests we
should read Article II as granting the executive
“general” unenumerated power subject only to speciác
qualiácations (p. 81). This is a jarring assertion, given
the ubiquitous Federalist assurances that the powers of
the proposed national government were limited to
those actually enumerated in the Constitution.[2]
Time and again, advocates of the proposed
Constitution highlighted the diãerence between state
constitutions of unenumerated general power and the
proposed federal Constitution’s limited enumerated
powers. As Charles Pinckney explained to the South
Carolina House of Representatives:

http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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The distinction which has been taken between the
nature of a federal and state government
appeared to be conclusive—that in the former, no
powers could be executed, or assumed, but such
as were expressly delegated; that in the latter, the
indeánite power was given to the government,
except on points that were by express compact
reserved to the people.[3]
The back and forth between Federalists and Antifederalists regarding the document’s balance of
delegated national power and reserved state
autonomy played a major role in the ratiácation
debates. Prakash’s account, however, is altogether
silent about Founding era-views of federalism and the
role federalism played in the drafting and ratiácation
of the federal Constitution. Instead, Prakash gives us
Alexander Hamilton’s explanation after the adoption
of the Constitution that:
It would not consist with the rules of sound
construction to consider this enumeration of
particular authorities as derogating from the more
comprehensive grant in the general clause [of
Article II]. (p. 71)
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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The problem, of course, is that post-adoption
statements by political players like Hamilton may or
may not reâect the original consensus understanding
of the text. This seems particularly likely when one
can ánd the same Alexander Hamilton prior to
ratiácation taking what appears to be a very diãerent
view of the principle of limited enumerated power. As
Hamilton wrote in Federalist No.32:
[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a
partial union or consolidation, the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which
were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the
United States.
Here, Hamilton is echoing similar promises by fellow
Publius-writer James Madison who also insisted prior
to the adoption of the Constitution that “[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and deáned” while “[t]hose which
are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indeánite.”[4] The point is that federal advocates
of the Constitution repeatedly described the delegated
powers of the national government—the entire
national government—as both limited and deáned.
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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They may have been lying, but the success of their
argument depended on their presenting a text that
could be read precisely as described by the Federalists.
Had they not done so, the state conventions would
have likely rejected the text.[5]
Even if one focuses on post-adoption debates, the idea
of unenumerated executive power implicates not only
standard “horizontal” separation of power
considerations, but vertical separation of power
doctrines as well. Prakash discusses executive power as
if it were simply a matter of allocation among the
three branches of the national government. But this
misses the cross-cutting valence of federalism—an
enormously important theory that informs the entire
American Constitution and gives it its peculiarly
American spin. For example, when Congress passed
Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, state assemblies raised
federalism objections both to national regulation of
speech but also ultra vires executive authority to
countermand state immigration policy.[6] In short, one
cannot construct a convincing account of the early
understanding national power—congressional or
presidential—without considering the reserved state
powers side of the issue.
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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Instead, Prakash highlights the post-adoption actions
of the person with the greatest incentive to ignore
federalism and expand the operational scope of
executive power: George Washington.[7] This not only
seems unwise from a Madisonian perspective (every
branch seeks to expand its own power), it results in a
purely nationalist perspective on the original
Constitution.
In fairness, Prakash does not completely limit his
investigations to Washington. Nevertheless, his book
spends so much time focused on the man that I found
myself wondering if the book’s title was purposefully
ambiguous. The “Constitution of the Original
Executive” could refer to the original Constitution. But
it could just as easily refer to The Original Executive,
George Washington, and his understanding of
executive power. If the latter, then the book is a boon
for anyone interested in our árst President, but it
poses something of a problem for those interested in
the original meaning of the Constitution.
Posted on 20 January 2016
KURT LASH holds the Guy Raymond Jones Chair in Law
at the University of Illinois College of Law. He is the
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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author of The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Privileges and Immunities of American
Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[1] See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The
Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre
Dame Law Review 1 (2015).
[2] See Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Power,
124 Yale L.J.F. 180 (2014)
(http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-sum-of-alldelegated-power).
[3] Charles Pinckney, Speech Before the South
Carolina House of Representatives (Jan 16, 1788), in 4
The Debates of the Several State Conventions, on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as
Recommended by the General Convention at
Philadelphia in 1787, at 259-60 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1891) [hereinafter Elliot’s Debates].
[4] The Federalist No 45, supra note __, at 292 (James
Madison).
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[5] An especially diäcult issue involves whether the
default rule of enumerated power (whether
congressional or executive) was understood to be
defeasible in situations involving a national
emergency. Adrian Vermeule, for example, argues that
the writers of the Federalist Papers described the
executive as enjoying broad and undeáned power in
times of national emergencies. See generally, Adrian
Vermeule, The Constitution of Risk (2014). Prakash,
however, not only insists on a default rule of general
undeáned power, he also rejects the idea of special
executive power in times of an emergency. See
Prakash at 206-15.
[6] See The Kentucky Resolution (1798).
[7] As Napoleon at St. Helena is reported to have
remarked to Las Casas, “he [Napoleon] would have
been a Washington had he been in Washington’s place,
and that Washington himself would have been a
Napoleon had he lived in France.” See https://www.hnet.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35731. Napoleon’s
remark nicely capture’s Madison’s insight that those
who wield power will seek to expand that power,
unless successfully opposed. In other words,
Washington’s expansive use of the executive branch
http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/george-washington-s-constitution
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may reâect more the political opportunity of a revered
national hero than the original public meaning of
Article II. (ht, Adrian Vermeule for the Napoleon
quote).
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